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published last year (1998), as the best source for answering my question about our modern identity. The contrast between the sets of volumes provides a measure of the professional distance we have traveled in 100 years. I shall then consider some aspects of our future and how we might expect to change yet further. This essay is a triptych of the naturalist: past, present, and future; history, modernity, and prophecy. The first two panels are clear; the third is, of course, blurred and impressionistic, while being at the same time the most enticing.
The Naturalist at the End of the Nineteenth Century
The roots of the modern naturalist go back deeply into natural history, that branch of the natural sciences originating in exploration and discovery that was practiced for centuries by natural philosophers, from before Aristotle to Alexander von Humboldt and beyond. In recent times natural history has been defined ecologically by Bates ([1950 Bates ([ ] 1990 as "biological investigation at the level of the individual organism: the study of the relations of organisms among themselves and with the physical environment, and of their organization into populations and communities." In 1899 the journal was subtitled "An Illustrated Magazine of Natural History." Being a magazine, it had editorials, much as Science and Nature do today, as well as scientific news (scientific expeditions, recent appointments, and resignations and deaths, both here and abroad), and reviews of recent literature in separate sections devoted to General Biology, Botany, Zoology, Petrography, Geology, Geography, Paleontology, and Anthropology. Its main articles were chiefly zoological and botanical, though occasionally anthropological or geological. It was truly, as stated, "A monthly journal devoted to the natural sciences in their widest sense." (The Linnean Society of London had, and still has, a similar goal.)
Every issue of The American Naturalist carries the logo "Devoted to the Conceptual Unification of the Biological Sciences." In 1898 this was explained in an editorial to mean the journal should counteract the tendency for naturalists to become too specialized and to do so by pub-lishing articles on a wide variety of subjects, even at the risk of being thought of as "a miscellaneous lot of articles which, for one reason or another, have failed to find space in the journals of the special sciences to which they rightly belong" (Bigelow 1898, p. 49) . The unifying theme, Bigelow suggested, might be "the earth and its inhabitants as a unit. Then the problem would be to describe the various parts of this unit and to explain their relations to one another ) may it not be legitimate to adopt it as the final purpose of a journal which is intended to represent the great body of naturalists in this country?" (Bigelow 1898, p. 51) .
In fact, unification of the biological sciences was achieved by putting everything of biological interest and some more between two covers. That is, it was a collection rather than a synthesis. Little use was made of the Darwinian paradigm as a framework for achieving unity. This is surprising in view of the importance of the DarwinWallace views of evolution to explorer-collector-naturalists in the latter part of the century, such as Bates (1863), Belt (1874) , and Wagner (1889) . The 1899 volume (33) has references to Charles Darwin on only nine pages. The "old Darwinian principle of direct benefit [of a trait] to its possessors" (Nutting 1899, p. 799 ) is referred to three times. For comparison, Wallace's (1871) Natural Selection is discussed in only one article, in the context of adaptive coloration of Orthoptera.
By and large, the naturalists 100 years ago were not a society waiting for Mendel's laws to be rediscovered. To varying degrees they were generalists (Mayr 1946) , inquisitive yet skeptical, busy collecting facts about nature, describing them carefully, interpreting them cautiously, and cataloging them systematically, yet for the most part falling short of the goal of "scientific natural history, in which," according to Huxley (1940, p. ix) , "the comparative treatment of patiently accumulated data is made to yield generalizations of first-class importance": unity sought in diversity. Grist to the naturalists' mill were such subjects as descriptions of the colors of monocotyledenous flowers; the systematics of insects, bryozoa, and hairworms; life histories of salamanders and lungfish; the problem of explaining the significance of marine phosphorescence; how snakes feed and medusae regenerate; discussion of how species can be classified into four types; and such curiosities as a chicken egg within another egg and a toad with five legs. Morphological and systematic studies predominated and, perhaps surprisingly, field investigations played a minor role. Experiments, in the laboratory and not in the field, were conducted to reveal physiological mechanisms, but description of new observations outnumbered the testing of hypotheses. Data were quantified but not analyzed. Volume 33 has one, empirically derived, equation:
where T is temperature in degrees Fahrenheit and N is the number of chirps per minute given by a tree cricket, Oecanthus niveus (Edes 1899, p. 937) .
Naturalists did not use statistical methods of analysis because such methods were not deemed to be necessary or even within the naturalists' powers to grasp and use. Contemporary attitudes are revealed in the review of books on statistics. Thus wrote one reviewer: "To solve some of the equations, logarithms, trigonometric functions and gamma functions have to be employed, and it is too much to hope that a large proportion of naturalists can use even these simple methods. ) Formulas are used very freely, which is no doubt an offense to some" (vol. 33, p. 522; emphasis mine). The reviewer of a book on descriptive statistics by Davenport (1899) wrote (vol. 33, p. 974) , "The gross methods already in vogue, being tolerably efficient for temporary and tentative purposes, will probably hold the field for a while at least, so it will be in the remote future when, through the plotting of curves and the use of logarithmic tables, we shall see 'by the use of quantitative method biology ) pass from the field of speculative sciences to that of the exact sciences. ' (p. 39) ."
And yet sophisticated statistical analysis of data of great potential interest to naturalists had already begun, in a manner that made Mendelism desirable but not strictly essential, and the results were also reviewed in this volume. Pearson's sixth Mathematical Contribution to the Theory of Evolution was summarized succinctly and then interpreted as follows: "Pearson concludes: Both fertility and fecundity are inherited, and probably in the manner prescribed by Galton's Law of Ancestral Heredity. ) The importance of the demonstration of the inheritance of fertility lies in the fact that the most fertile class tends to form a larger and larger percentage of the whole population. Now fertility is correlated with various physical qualities: consequently, these physical qualities are bound to become predominant, if there is no interfering factor at work" (vol. 33, p. 663) . With a small change in focus, this would not be far off a modern statement of selection on fitness-related traits, with genetic correlations between characters being one form of an "interfering factor at work."
Thus, a biometrical branch of biology was developing that would later revolutionize the naturalists' modus operandi, but in 1899 its influence had yet to be felt. This is but one example of the curious (with hindsight) cohabitation of ancient and modern theories, ideas, and practices. As another example, the review of Davenport's Statistical Methods follows a few pages after another, not Note: Some subjective judgment on relative importance had to be exercised when articles covered more than one topic. unsympathetic, review by Gerrould (1899) of a book on vitalism (Driesch 1899) . A theory of Mesozoic landbridge connections to Antarctica (vol. 33, and the report of a recently accomplished transplant of the cornea from the eye of one rabbit to another (vol. 33, p. 62 ) have a modern ring, whereas a theory of sex, that all living substances have two inverse and complementary types (Le Dantec 1899), has long since been discarded, and so has an anti-Weismann theory of telegony (the first of two males to mate with a female can influence the traits of the offspring sired by the second; this is not to be confused with sperm precedence).
H. C. Bumpus helped to bury the theory of telegony by argument. His final sentence is prophetic in showing how a nineteenth-century problem would yield to a twentieth-century solution: "The vexed problems of heredity never will be solved until a great many individuals or institutions seriously undertake experimental breeding" (Bumpus 1899, p. 922) . The problem was of major importance; the solution, the discovery of genetics, was the temporarily misplaced key that opened the door to the major discoveries of the twentieth century and provided a truly novel way of achieving conceptual unification.
The Naturalist at the End of the Twentieth Century
In this century we have transformed our identity (Futuyma 1998) . We have dropped geology and petrography from our profile, weakened our dependence on traditional natural history (Mayr 1946; Dobzhansky 1966) , and acquired newly invented disciplines such as genetics, unrecognizably altered ones like ecology, and newly developed methods of analysis such as mathematical modeling. Our membership has increased enormously and has become more international. We have grown in size and changed in shape.
To characterize the collective personality of the late twentieth-century naturalist, I have done the modern thing of quantifying the publications in The American Naturalist. The frequencies show the predominance of ecology, behavior, and genetics in the modern naturalist. They do not reveal three extra characteristics of importance in the modern profile. First, evolution is a primary or secondary theme of almost every article, mainly as adaptive explanation for observed phenomena ( fig. 1 ), less as mechanism of change, and least as history. Second, mathematical modeling (61 articles) is far more prevalent than laboratory experimentation (25 articles) as a method of inquiry. Field studies, comprising experimentation (14 articles) and observation (seven articles), take third place. These are almost, but not quite, exclusive categories. Herein lies a modern version of the disadvantage of specialization recognized at the end of the nineteenth century: specialization by mode of investigation limits the degree of insightful and fruitful interaction between theoretical and empirical modes of inquiry. Third, crossing the boundaries of disciplines is a rewarding although still relatively rare habit. There are good examples of the value of transferring ideas from one field to problem solving in another (e.g., from neural physiology to explain feeding specialization). Nevertheless, despite our declared emphasis on unification, synthesis is not the prime focus of most articles.
Remarkably, Darwin is still quoted often (nine articles), but no longer for the "old Darwinian principle of direct benefit [of a trait] to its possessors." Instead, he is cited for his work on two enduring problems, the operation of sexual selection and the evolution of mating systems.
Comparison of today's journal with that of 1899 reveals the differences across a century. A majority of the articles in 1899 have no counterpart in 1998, and evolution is not a prominent feature of the 1899 literature. If anything, differences are understated by a simple listing. You cannot tell from the table that parasite-host dynamics and extinction are two preoccupations of modern ecologists that were not on the agenda 100 years ago. The emphasis in the earlier literature was firmly placed on a form of descriptive investigation that now plays only a subsidiary role in phylogeny, ecology, and behavior. Where modern studies of morphology are carried out with birds' tails to test hypotheses of sexual selection, for example, 100 years ago the colors of flowers and the structure of sea-pens were described because they were insufficiently known and were of interest for their own sake.
The modern naturalist can therefore be characterized as basically an explorer and tester of evolutionary and ecological ideas that are developed to reveal and explain regularities in nature: in genetic structure as much as in phenotypic structure, and in ecological and behavioral function more than in physiological function. Explorations take us even farther afield than is indicated by the topics in table 1, and in two directions, the macroscopic and the microscopic.
Missing from the table is paleoecology and the ecological exploration of evolution through deep time. For Wallace (1855, p. 190) , "To discover how the extinct species have from time to time been replaced by new ones down to the very latest geological period, is the most difficult, and at the same time the most interesting problem in the natural history of the earth." This task, and the companion one of determining why species have replaced each other, is as much a central problem in modern evolutionary biology as it was to Wallace (e.g., Graham et al. 1995; Knoll et al. 1996; Conway Morris 1998) . It takes the modern form of trying to bring together a paleontological focus on patterns of evolution in relation to changing environments over millions of years and a neontological focus on observable and interpretable processes of microevolution in contemporary time. For example, Vermeij (1987) has used information about functional morphology of gastropod molluscs, their behavior and ecology inferred from comparative studies of living relatives, and independent evidence of paleoenvironments to explain the large-scale patterns of diversification of these well-fossilized animals.
At the other end of the scale lie microscopic phenomena that occur within individual cells, including molecular genetic structure and function and the mechanisms of control and regulation of development. Naturalists encounter a variety of organisms in nature and attempt to explain what they find. While Marston Bates's emphasis on the individual, singly or in groups, is still appropriate, the search for answers to many questions is being taken increasingly to cellular and macromolecular levels, into the molecular realm of cytogenetic interactions and into the realm of molecular evolution for the reconstruction of phylogeny. Perhaps this is the most fundamental change to the naturalists' identity that has occurred this century. To illustrate with one example from hundreds, observed sex ratios in populations of the parasitic wasp Nasonia vitripennis cannot be understood without a knowledge of intracellular and intergenomic interactions with a bacterial symbiont, Wolbachia (Werren 1998) . At the end of the twentieth century, we confront a natural history of genomic structure and function that needs to be known in conjunction with a natural history of whole organisms for a full understanding of diversity at the level of populations in nature. The scope for biological synthesis has never been greater.
Thus, my answer to the question posed in the title of this essay is, simply, that to be a naturalist is to ask questions directly about organisms in nature and to seek answers wherever they are to be found (macroecology, population genetics, etc.), by whatever means are available (field experimentation, analysis of DNA, etc.).
The Naturalist in the Twenty-First Century
What can be expected in the future? Just as at the beginning of this century, some current ideas are destined to be discarded and others will continue to be useful. Without prescience it is risky to guess which will be which. This reminds me of a story of a Harvard professor who told his introductory class of medical students that half of what they were about to be told was true and the other half would eventually be proved incorrect, the problem being that by the end of the course neither he nor the students would know which half was which.
The best predictor of tomorrow's weather is today's, and in the same way and for the same reason, the best guide to future research is contemporary research. Some projections of current research axes into the future are clear to see. Six obvious choices are problems of understanding mammalian brain organization and function and their evolution, the evolution of human characteristics in our ancestors, the pattern of phylogeny and the process of speciation, how complex communities of organisms are built up from simple ones and how they function, how genomic potential is translated into phenotypic reality through development and how that translation evolves, and the origin and early evolution of living things (see also Murphy and O'Neill 1995; Wilson 1998) . It is also safe to predict that a vastly richer understanding of the history of life will be achieved, in terms of phylogenetic relationships and the evolutionary origins of key traits and processes. Furthermore, the rate and directions of progress will be strongly influenced by the development of new techniques. In this century we have seen what the electron microscope has done for cytology, what computers have done for quantitative biology, and what the polymerase chain reaction, cloning, and DNA sequencing have done for molecular genetics. Recovering evolutionary history will proceed faster as a result of new technologies yet to be conceived, let alone developed.
I would like to go farther, while at the same time being mindful, like Mark Twain (1883), of the dangers of extrapolating too far from known facts into the realm of the ridiculous. He wrote (1883, pp. 207-208) , "The Mississippi between Cairo and New Orleans was twelve hundred and fifteen miles long one hundred and seventy-six years ago," and since then it "has shortened itself two hundred and forty-two miles [by "cut-offs" of meandering loops]. ) Now, if I wanted to be one of those ponderous scientific people, and 'let on' to prove ) what will occur in the far future by what has occurred in late years, what an opportunity is here! ) Any person can see that seven hundred and forty-two years from now the Lower Mississippi will be only a mile and three quarters long, and Cairo and New Orleans will have joined their streets together, and be plodding comfortably along under a single mayor and a mutual board of aldermen." He then concluded with the comment, "There is something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact."
Undeterred by a high ratio of conjecture to fact, I anticipate as one major development in the next century the experimental reconstruction by genetic engineering of extinct species or intermediate lineages between existing species. Now that we know how small changes in the timing of regulatory genes during early development can have large effects on adult phenotype (Raff 1996) , subject to environmental modulation, and how those genes acquire or are coopted for new functions, it becomes possible to alter phenotype by experimentally altering genes governing development ( fig. 2) . For the task of reconstruction there are strong difficulties ahead. One is making a choice between alternative possible genetic constitutions of extinct species. Another is the assessment of interactions between genotypes and environments. These difficulties will be greatest for reconstructing taxa that have long since become extinct without leaving behind even a single representative that could act as a blueprint for the rest. A taxonomic neighbor will have to substitute. Some missing pieces in the tree of life will thus be filled in, however imperfectly and insecurely. In the process, much should be learned about ancestral character states in phylogenies and which developmental programs are viable, and why, and which are not. All of this may help us to make far better evolutionary sense of patterns of diversification of organs and organisms and of some of the major transitions in organization (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995) than is possible today.
Other missing pieces will be filled in by the less dramatic and more traditional methods of excavating fossils and searching for new species of micro-and macroorganisms in tropical rainforests and depths of the ocean, in caves and in ice caps. Exploration and discovery, which played such a large role in the activities of nineteenth-century naturalists, still offer abundant scope to the twenty-firstcentury naturalists. It has been estimated that many millions of species, perhaps 10 million or more, await scientific discovery and description (Wilson 1992; Stork 1997) . If this is not enough encouragement for the sys- tematics branch of the modern naturalists, then surely it is given by such discoveries as an extraordinary new invertebrate phylum, the Cycliophora (Funch and Kristensen 1995); evidence of a new kingdom, the archaebacteria (Barnes et al. 1996; McInerney et al. 1997 ; see also Mayr 1998); and rediscoveries of apparently extinct species such as Takhtajania perrieri, the only extant African or Madagascan representative of the primitive plant family Winteraceae (Schatz et al. 1998) . Modern extinctions (Stearns and Stearns 1999 ) spice this encouragement with urgency.
Genetic engineering and discovery of new species and higher taxa will give us a better appreciation of how the tree of life diversified. By themselves they will provide only partial enlightenment on why it diversified in the way that it did. Interpreting evolutionary history requires a knowledge of genetics of organisms and their environments as well as of their interaction. Here I would like to raise a concern about the future of our society, as well as society in general, and the future of naturalists whose work is done out of doors in moderately wild places. It is that environments that are the products of natural processes have been and are continuing to be degraded and destroyed at an unprecedented rate (Lubchenko et al. 1991) . As a result we are losing parts of life's history that would appear to be unrecoverable except, to an unknown and probably limited extent, by the process of genetic engineering referred to above (which is no cause for complacency). We are reducing the means of interpreting the history as well, to the degree that present-day natural environments provide critical information about the natural relationship between organisms and their environments in the past. Fortunately, there is unprecedented awareness of environmental deterioration and preparedness to do something about it (Reaka-Kudla et al. 1997; Lubchenko 1998) and, in the case of global climate change, to learn from it (Travis and Futuyma 1993) .
The Field Naturalist in the Future
Expressing concern about deterioration of the environment has been going on for a long time. It is to be found in the writings of Darwin and Wallace, for example, and in contemporaries of theirs such as Henry Moseley (1879), who went around the world on a famous research vessel, the Challenger, 40 years after the voyage of the Beagle, for about the same length of time as the Beagle. In this century, Our Plundered Planet (Osborn 1948) and Silent Spring (Carson 1962 ) sounded the alarm with more than their unequivocal titles (also Hynes 1960; Rudd 1964) , and one encounters this alarm with increasing frequency in books, the ecological literature, and the popular press. Conservation societies and journals have sprung up in response to the alarm to create awareness of the problems and to seek scientific as well as political remedies. An element of siege mentality prevails in the community (for examples see Stearns and Stearns 1999) . From this literature I have chosen two passages to quote for their combination of passion, eloquence, and relevance to evolutionary biology. The first, by Gentry (1989) , concludes a discussion of ex-traordinarily high rates of plant speciation in the cloud forests of Ecuador, coupled with a sobering account of an extraordinarily high rate of extinction of local endemics resulting from deforestation, as follows: "Not only is mankind's biological heritage poorer as a result [of deforestation], but our intellectual heritage is also eroded as these uniquely active laboratories of speciation disappear from the face of the earth. Moreover, those of us interested in evolutionary processes have an added incentive for preserving our planet's dwindling remnants of tropical forest: We need them if we hope ever to truly understand the processes of speciation and evolution that have given rise to the diversity of life on earth" (Gentry 1989, p. 127) .
Henry Moseley had written about the extinction of terrestrial species 100 years earlier ("Animals and plants ) are rapidly perishing day by day, and will soon be, like the Dodo, things of the past ) for ever a gap in the knowledge of mankind." [Moseley 1879, p. 519] ) but thought that the deep marine environment was safe enough for scientists to study at their leisure. Here, though, is what Paul Dayton has to say about the effects of the fishing industry on the composition of communities in marine environments:
One inescapable consequence of this widespread damage is the loss of the opportunity to study and understand intact communities. In most cases there are no descriptions of the pristine habitats. The damage is so pervasive that it may be impossible ever to know or reconstruct the ecosystem. In fact, each succeeding generation of biologists has markedly different expectations of what is natural because they study increasingly altered systems that bear less and less resemblance to the former, preexploitation versions. This loss of perspective is accompanied by fewer direct human experiences (or even memories) of once undisturbed systems. The effects of humans sometimes result in cascading ecological changes-a void often in part filled with introduced or inappropriate imposters that replace and mask the traces of the former natural system-but the species often simply disappear, leaving no conspicuous effect on the community. As with the loss of human cultures and languages after the passing of the elders with their wisdom, so too is humanity losing the evolutionary wisdom found in intact ecosystems (Dayton 1998, p. 821) .
"Seek simplicity and distrust it"; so runs Whitehead's (1920, p. 163 ) "guiding motto in the life of every natural philosopher." To this I would add a corollary: seek generality and distrust it. In the less diverse world of the future, it will be increasingly easy to find both simplicity and generality, yet, with some irony, increasingly necessary to distrust them.
Environmental concern is not a message that appears often in the pages of The American Naturalist, although it is increasingly present as subtext to ecological articles on extinction, which themselves are increasing in frequency. Yet as these quotations show, it is highly relevant to the society's goals for two main reasons. First, and most obvious, extinctions and loss of habitat deprive us of what we have chosen to study. For astrophysics the equivalent would be losing several percent of the stars in the universe each century because of human activities in some hypothetical way. I cannot imagine that astrophysicists would keep the problem to themselves, or even turn a blind eye to what was happening just as long as they had a few trillion stars left to work with.
Second, and less obvious, the remnants of natural environments and their occupants color our view of natural processes, and such views may be distorted. Terrestrial habitats are fragmented by human activities, landscapes are reconfigured, waterways are polluted, top predators disappear, extraneous species are introduced, others are introduced to "control" them yet control or eliminate native species instead, community composition becomes altered, species dependencies change, and those species with weedy characteristics tend to predominate-all of this in the name of human welfare or tradition.
The changes themselves are not without biological interest. They can throw light on ecological properties such as community stability (Chapin et al. 1997; Vitousek et al. 1997) and evolutionary processes such as the evolution of cryptic coloration (Kettlewell 1973; Majerus 1998) , sexual selection, and speciation (Seehausen et al. 1997; Feder 1998) . But the resulting communities and their functioning can hardly be held up as a model of the natural state. Yet we are in danger of doing just that, especially, I believe, in theoretical investigations where conceptions (and perceptions) of the world we inherit are brought to bear on the delimitation of a problem, assumptions of models that are used to search for a solution, the interpretation of its solution, and then in external validation through empirical work.
An appropriate icon for this worrying trend is Albrecht Dürer's woodcut of the Indian rhinoceros brought to Europe (Lisbon) in 1515. Dürer did not see the animal but made the woodcut from descriptions and sketches provided to him, committing a small error in the form of a gratuitous, unicorn-like, spiral horn on the shoulders. Derivative artists made further copying errors ( fig. 3) , adding to the faithfully reproduced yet erroneous spine over the course of the next two centuries. Fortunately, the rhinoceros did not become extinct, and representations of the animal were eventually brought into line with reality (Cole 1953) .
The difficult question to answer is: How far wrong do we go in taking a human-altered environment as a proxy for a natural one and a cardboard cutout view of the natural world as exemplified, for example, by paintings of For example, the reproductive biology of a tree, Calvaria major (Sapotaceae), on Mauritius cannot be confidently interpreted in evolutionary terms because possible agents that facilitated the germination of the large and thick-walled fruit are missing. One suggested missing agent is the digestive tract of the extinct dodo (Raphus cucullatus); passage through the gut of this large avian herbivore may have been almost essential for germination (from a painting by Tracy Pederson, reproduced here with permission of Visual Resources for Ornithologists [VIREO] , Academy of Natural Sciences, Philadelphia). nature "in the raw" by Henri Rousseau (e.g., see the cover of issues of Animal Behaviour)? Ecologically we can go seriously astray (e.g., see Hedin et al. 1995) , but is the same true for evolutionary studies? For some parts of evolutionary biology the answer is no. We do not need natural environments to understand the principles of natural selection, sexual selection, genetic drift, frequency dependence, epistasis, and so forth, or the Wrightian concept of an adaptive landscape. The whole gamut of intracellular evolutionary interactions between different genomes is played out without dependence on particular environments external to the organisms, or so it appears. Phylogenies can be reconstructed from comparisons of mitochondrial DNA molecules without any knowledge of the environments the taxa occupy or occupied. However, for other parts of evolutionary biology, the loss of natural biota does matter. It matters seriously when we attempt to interpret particular details of the evolutionary history of organisms in terms of observable components and processes in their contemporary environments.
I will illustrate the last point with an example. On the island of Mauritius, a tree, Calvaria major (Sapotaceae), produces large fruits that do not germinate or that germinate very rarely. Not surprisingly, the population has declined toward extinction. The reproductive biology of the species cannot be interpreted confidently in evolutionary terms because possible agents that facilitated the germination of the fruit are missing. One suggested missing agent is the digestive tract of the dodo (Raphus cucullatus; Vaughan and Wiehe 1941; Temple 1977) , absent from the island for more than 350 years as a result of direct and indirect effects of human occupation. In this example, knowledge of the predisturbance Mauritius community was sufficient, even though meager, for these authors to speculate about the missing factor. Moreover, observations of basalt rocks the size of golf balls in the gut of dodos (Temple 1983) and experiments with turkeys (Temple 1977) as a substitute for dodos demonstrated the plausibility of the hypothesis that passage through the gut of a large avian herbivore was essential or almost essential for germination (fig. 4) . The hypothesis that gut passage was essential has nevertheless been much debated (Owadally 1979; Temple 1979 Temple , 1983 Temple , 1984 Cheke et al. 1984; Vaughan 1984) . That debate is my main point. Essential, helpful, or irrelevant, the role of the dodo can now no longer be known and must forever remain conjectural. This is no isolated case. The evolution of some Neotropical fruit characteristics (Janzen and Martin 1982) , the evolution of leaf form in some Hawaiian plants (Givnish et al. 1994 ; see also James and Burney 1997) , and the pollination biology of certain Opuntia cactus species and why they hybridize (Janzen 1986 ) cannot be known in the absence of some key missing herbivores, dispersal agents, and pollinators, now extinct as a result of human activities.
Another way of appreciating the same problem is to ask what our store of evolutionary knowledge would be if several twentieth-century model systems in evolutionary biology had gone the way of the dodo before the century began, for example, the silverswords and Drosophila of Hawaii; or stalk-eyed flies and guppies; Helianthus sunflowers and Heliconius butterflies; Caribbean Anolis lizards; Daphnia of holarctic lakes and haplochromine cichlid fish of the African rift lakes; Arabidopsis, Caenorhabditis, and zebra fish? And what might we have lost without knowing we had lost it, or how to use it?
I have continued at length on the precariousness of what can be called habitat-dependent evolutionary biology because natural history of this sort is becoming increasingly unnatural history. In contrast to the long-term prospects of field naturalists, all the other activities listed in table 1 appear to have a healthy future.
The Society's Goal: Unification of the Biological Sciences
The American Naturalist started off being "Dedicated to the Unification of the Biological Sciences," was changed to "Devoted to the Advancement and Correlation of the Biological Sciences," and then, as recently as 1977, essentially returned to a stronger version of the original goal, to be "Devoted to the Conceptual Unification of the Biological Sciences." The key words here are "conceptual unification." The American Society of Naturalists is uniquely suited to this goal by virtue of the breadth of the naturalists' mandate to explain biological diversity. We seek unity without sacrificing diversity, and we seek explanations for diversity in as unified a manner as possible. I believe we can do a better job of this if we are more conscious, more explicitly aware, of the desirability of synthesis at as high a level of integration as is within our reach. I say this as a consumer of The American Naturalist. How is conceptual unification best sought and achieved? There is more than one answer; I will offer a couple. Like many others I see the best pathway through the study of evolution (e.g., Smocovitis 1996) . Disparate areas of biology are united by evolutionary principles that apply to them all. Few biologists would quarrel with Dobzhansky's "reckless generalization" that "nothing makes sense in biology except in the light of evolution" (Dobzhansky 1964, p. 449) , providing it is preceded by the word "ultimately," since not all biologists who would call themselves naturalists pay attention to it or even feel the need to. For example, an ecologist's world can make perfect sense, in the short term at least, in the absence of evolutionary considerations. Moreover, there are other organizing principles that fall outside evolutionary biology yet illuminate it, such as physical laws of thermodynamics and scaling (e.g., West et al. 1997) .
Unification requires a common language, and mathematics is a common language. Pages of the modern American Naturalist are filled with ideas creatively explored in the language of mathematics. J. B. S. Haldane once wrote somewhere that "An ounce of mathematics is more convincing than a ton of verbal argument." It is easy to see his point. Nonetheless, there is an ever-present danger that mathematics will be thought to say more than it does (Hogben 1937) , especially when interpreted beyond the domain of its applicability. Excessive use of mathematics has been lampooned in a joke, which I have heard twice, to the effect that the society is now dedicated to the conceptual unification of the mathematical sciences. Yet there are limits to the degree to which the complexity of the natural biological world can be captured by this language. Much of that complexity resides in the ton of verbal argument, and discarding it is either desirable or not, depending on whether you believe that, metaphorically, a deity (Paley) or the devil (Einstein) is in the details. This polarization reflects a permanent tension between the drive to generalize and the realization that nature is too diverse to be reduced to a simple set of statements. On this theme I have one final point to make.
Concern over fragmented specializations motivated the society's desire for conceptual unification at the end of the last century. A hundred years later, the need for conceptual unification is, if anything, greater, as collectively we are a more generalist population than ever before, yet we are individually more specialized. Modern specialization takes different forms. I have referred to one already, specialization by mode of scientific inquiry. Another is an intense focus on model systems. We celebrate outstanding successes from concentration of effort on a few "tractable" systems, but at the same time we should be concerned that they come at a certain cost of breadth. This cost may be experienced more in evolutionary biology than in ecology. Model systems are widely spaced on the taxonomic landscape (Nijhout 1994) and yield different results and insights. It is the differences that give rise to a problem; generalizing confidently from them is difficult. The remedy is to pay more attention to the intervening taxa that are relatively or entirely neglected so as to obtain a better grasp of how far an understanding of one set of organisms can be extended to others.
Additional rewards will come from transferring concepts from one field to another, concepts such as tradeoffs, fractal dimensions, chaos, metapopulations, inclusive fitness, and the like. Out of such transfers are born new insights, new ways of looking at problems, even new ways of looking at old solutions, and a better appreciation of unity at a time when various economic factors such as research grants and social forces associated with career advancement encourage specialization and the fragmentation of biology. As an example from within biology, transfer of the concepts of variation and selection from population genetics to cell biology has led to new insights into epigenetic phenomena such as "overproduction" of mitotic microtubules (Kirschner 1992; Gerhart and Kirschner 1997) . Microtubules not only perform a vital function but they also generate flexibility that is believed to facilitate evolutionary change (Kirschner 1992) . This example, and similar ones of transient excesses of synapses and neurons in mammalian neuromuscular development (Brown et al. 1991; Jacobson 1991) and "overproduction" of song types by young birds (Marler and Peters 1982) , may be relevant to Haldane's (1958, p. 12 ) speculation that "many of the major features of evolution were due to the fact that some groups kept possibilities open which others did not." Now there is an interesting idea worth pursuing in the twenty-first century (e.g., see Wagner et al. 1999 )!
In conclusion, I believe that the society's mission of unification can be achieved by a broad, evolution-centered approach to explaining all of organic diversity: the origin and evolution of organisms and their behavioral and physiological functioning as individuals and their ecological functioning as interacting populations in communities. This approach seeks an understanding across the biological spectrum and at all levels of biological organization in an integrated manner by employing mathematics as the language of choice where possible, but not exclusively; by encouraging new syntheses of ideas and information across disciplines and modes of investigation; and by inviting nonmembers from disciplines not well represented in the society to join the enterprise.
Coda
I began by using the fourth aphorism of Brillat-Savarin (1826) to introduce the analogy of a consumer society, and I conclude with his fifth aphorism as an analogy of the value, if not the necessity, of reading The American Naturalist: "Le Créateur, en condamnant l'homme à manger pour vivre, l'y invite par l'appétit, et l'en récompense par le plaisir." (The creator, while condemning mankind to eat in order to live, equips us with an appetite and rewards us with pleasure.)
